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THE AGE OF AUTONOMY: LEGAL
RECONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CHILDHOOD
By Janet L. Dolgin*

I. INTRODUCTION

American society and law are confused about the scope of
childhood and about the status of children. Society safeguards old
images of childhood, but at the same time, constructs new, conflicting
images. Within the last few decades, images of childhood have shifted
dramatically. Associated almost exclusively in the first half of the
twentieth century with home and "mother," and understood as innocent,
fragile, and precious,' children are now also described as "the vanguard
of a new, decultured generation, isolated from family and neighborhood,
shrugged at by parents, [and] dominated by peers."2 In short, old truths
about children and childhood compete with, and are transformed by,
new ones.
Reflecting the larger society, American law has begun, though with
significant hesitation and concern, to reconstruct images of childhood,
and thus, to reconsider its treatment of children. As the law struggles to
preserve traditional understandings of childhood generally and of
* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra
University School of Law. I am grateful to Shara Newman, of the Hofstra University
School of Law (J.D. 1999) for assistance with research. I also thank Hofstra University
for providing me with the research support that made preparation of this article possible.
1. The description is of a pervasive social image of childhood. In fact, class has
been a crucial determinant of any particularchild's having been understood to reflect or
not to reflect the cultural ideal. For the most part, the image of childhood constructed
during the nineteenth century and elaborated during the twentieth century referred
implicitly to middle-class (and richer) children but not to poor children. This implicit
exclusion of poor children from increasingly romanticized images of childhood led to
the development-also implicit-within family law of two sets of rules. One set
regulated middle-class and rich families. The second set regulated poor families. See
JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR 145-212 (Joel F. Handler ed., 1964)

(describing the development in California of separate system of family law for the poor).
2.

Kay S. Hymowitz, Kids Today Are Growing Up Way Too Fast,WALL ST. J.,

Oct. 28, 1998, at A22.
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children in familial contexts in particular, it redefines certain children,
for certain purposes, as virtually indistinguishable from adults.
Consequently, the law spawns and struggles to harmonize, contradictory
definitions of childhood and conflicting rules for regulating children's
behavior.
The law has redefined children as autonomous individuals, hardly
different from their adult counterparts, within two quite different
contexts-a domestic context and a criminal context. Within the last
few decades, the law has dramatically altered its response to children
within certain dysfunctional families and within the juvenile justice
system. The law's efforts in each context are startling.
In general, as American law has broadly redefined adults within
families, it has refrained from treating children similarly. Widely,
courts and legislatures have tempered the implications of changes in
family law affecting adults by re-affirming the law's traditional
understandings of children. Thus, the law's willingness to treat certain
children within familial contexts in a most untraditional fashion
demands explanation.
Equally surprising as the law's readiness to reconceptualize
children within certain families, is its even greater readiness to
reconceptualize juvenile offenders, and in doing so, to dismantle a
juvenile justice system constructed about a century ago. Understood, at
least in theory, through most of the twentieth century as vulnerable and
in need of protection and redirection rather than of punishment, juvenile
offenders, especially those associated with serious crimes, are now
widely viewed as essentially incorrigible.
Increasingly, the law
abandons familial metaphors in understanding and dealing with such
children and defines them as autonomous individuals. As a result, the
justification for treating children who commit crimes differently from
adults who commit crimes erodes. The redefinition of children within
this context is as startling as that of children within dysfunctional
families. The very children who seem most in need of adult help are
being denied even the pretense of such help.
This Article aims to explain the peculiarity involved in the law's
redefining children in two contexts in which such redefinitions seem
least felicitous. Toward this effort, Part II, following this introductory
section, outlines the developing preference within society and within the
law for individualism within American families, especially insofar as
adults are concerned. Part III considers the depth of social ambivalence
about that preference with regard to understandings of children and
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childhood. Part IV details and compares concrete legal responses to
children in dysfunctional families and to children within the juvenile
justice system. Part V focuses on the implications of defining children
as autonomous individuals. First, this Part illustrates the phenomenon
by describing social images, including media images, of children
responsible for serious crimes. This Part then considers some broad
social implications of redefining certain children as virtually
indistinguishable from adults.
II. SHIFTING VISIONS OF FAMILY

A vision of family, constructed in the early years of the Industrial
Revolution, and widely institutionalized in the succeeding century and a
half, blurs.' For almost two centuries, the American family, understood
as a holistic, hierarchical social unit, grounded in enduring truth, was
understood to provide a complement to, and sanctuary from, the
marketplace. Children, central to the family, were seen as affectionate,
vulnerable and ultimately precious. During the last several decades, the
family has been expressly and dramatically transformed from a holistic
social unit, to a more amorphous collection of autonomous individuals,
understood to relate to each other as family members only insofar as
they choose to do so. This process of transformation has been slower
and less certain with regard to children in families than with regard to
adults but, nonetheless, has begun to occur.
From at least the start of the nineteenth century until the middle
decades of the twentieth century, Americans broadly viewed the family
as a domain of life largely separate from the autonomous individuality
central to the world of the marketplace. The traditional family
represented a world of status-hierarchically structured and conceived
as a whole-that contrasted almost completely with the universe of the
3. Within the culture broadly, alternative visions of family always existed
alongside the so-called "traditional family." This article uses the term "traditional
family" to refer to the form of family that was constructed in the early years of the
Industrial Revolution and that, at least as an ideological matter, was preserved and
glorified through the middle decades of the twentieth century. See infra notes 4-22 and
accompanying text. To some extent, alternative visions of the traditional family coexisted, and could be correlated with differences in class and ethnicity. See, e.g.,
STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 67-80, 83-105 (1988) (describing Afro-American family and
working class family). Thus, the term "traditional family" is used here broadly to refer
to certain cultural dimensions of mainstream American families from the early years of
the nineteenth century until the last several decades of the twentieth century.

QLR

[Vol. 18:421

marketplace, with which it co-existed.
In the traditional family,
relationships were understood as particularistic, enduring, and grounded
in firm biological truths (e.g., of "blood" and "genes").5 Within
families, status dictated the scope of roles. So, for instance, wives were
subservient to their husbands, and children to their parents and elders.
These patterns were understood to reflect natural and biological truth,
not unanchored social preferences. Thus, parents were expected to love
and care for their children, and children to obey and respect their
parents, not because either party chose to do so, but because of each
party's position within the hierarchy of family status.
The American anthropologist, David M. Schneider, writing at the
middle of the twentieth century, just before the strength and consistency
of far-reaching transformations in the family became apparent in the last
three decades of the century, portrayed the American family as a unit of
love and loyalty and of "diffuse, enduring solidarity,, 6 conclusively
differentiated from the world of work and money. Schneider wrote:
[T]he contrast between home and work brings out aspects which complete the
picture of the distinctive features of kinship in American culture. This can
best be understood in terms of the contrast between love and money which
stand for home and work. Indeed, what one does at home, it is said, one does
for love, not for money, while what one does at work one does strictly for
money, not for love. Money is material, it is power, it is impersonal and
universalistic, unqualified by considerations of sentiment and morality.
Relations of work and money are temporary, transient, contingent. Love on
the other hand is highly personal and particularistic, and beset with

4. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 24-28 (1998) (describing traditional family as

universe of status relations).
5. This description is of an ideology of family and does not presume the truth or
falsity of that ideology's components. By ideology this article means the underlying
assumptions in and through which people in a culture understand themselves and their
world. It does not mean a set of political beliefs. The use is in harmony with that of the
French anthropologist Louis Dumont. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of
matter but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out
when everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take
everything that is socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it
is a living whole, the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be
blocked out by the a priori introduction of our current dichotomies.
Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARx 22 (1977).
6. DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CuLTuRAL ACCOUNT 50(1968).
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considerations of sentiment and morality. Where love is spiritual, money is
material. 7

As Schneider suggests, the ideology of the traditional family was
largely constructed in relation to its perceived social contrary. Relations
at home were understood as contrasting completely with relations at
work. The marketplace, populated by putatively equal, autonomous
individuals was identified with men. The domestic arena was associated
with women, who were expected to nurture their children and provide
sanctuary to their husbands. Woman was separated from work and
defined as nurturer and protector of sacred values.8 She was privileged
or relegated, depending on perspective, to serve hearth and home, to
provide for her husband, and to shape her children's souls and futures. 9
Children, central to the traditional family, were conceptualized as
the treasures around which the home was organized and whose interests
it was meant to serve. The "economically 'worthless' but emotionally
'priceless' child" of the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries, was
understood as essentially innocent.'0
Carl Degler described the
differentiation of childhood from adulthood as the most important
alteration in the evolution of the nineteenth century family. Degler
wrote:
[C]hildhood itself was perceived as it is today, as a period of life not only
worth recognizing and cherishing but extending. Moreover, simply because
7.

David M. Schneider, Kinship, Nationality and Religion in American Culture,

in FORMS OF SYMBOLIC ACTION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1969 ANNUAL SPRING MEETING
ON THE AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 119 (Robert F. Spencer ed., 1969).

8. This pattern developed only after the start of the Industrial Revolution. During
the colonial period, work largely occurred in or near to the home. Colonial fathers were
patriarchal, but men, women, and older children all participated in the unified world of
work and home. See BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEiDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD:

150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS'

ADVICE TO WOMEN 5-10 (1978).

9. A popular nineteenth century women's magazine described wives and mothers
as "forming the future patriot, statesman, or enemy of his country, [but] more than this,
she is sowing the seeds of virtue or vice which will fit him for Heaven or for eternal
misery." MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 52-53 (1994) (citing MAXINE
MARGOLIS, MOTHERS AND SUCH: VIEws OF AMERICAN WOMEN AND WHY THEY
CHANGED 38 (1984)).
10.

VIVANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL

VALUE OF CHILDREN 3 (1985).

During the nineteenth century, working-class children

continued to play a central role in providing cheap labor in the new industrial enterprise.
Only by the start of the twentieth century, with the advent of child labor legislation and
universal compulsory education, did working-class children become part of the
"nonproductive world of childhood." Id. at 5-6.
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children were being seen for the first time [by the end of the eighteenth
century] as special, the family, reason for being, its justification as it were,
was increasingly related to the proper rearing of children."

At the same time, society began to extend the limits of childhood with
the elaboration of an adolescent stage."
Changes in family law after the start of the nineteenth century
reflected social images of nurturing, self-sacrificing mothers and of
protected, coddled children, both differentiated from men, work, and the
world of autonomous individuality. Even in the first decades of the
nineteenth century, courts in the United States began to overturn a longstanding pattern of assuming fathers the natural custodians of their
children." By mid-century, American courts looked explicitly to the
interests of children in resolving parental disputes over custody. More
and more often, children's interests were associated with protections
afforded by maternal nurture and love. During the nineteenth century,
the "best-interest standard" developed hand-in-hand with a preference
for maternal custody. 4 The maternal preference doctrine 15 reflected a
growing desire that women and children remain separate from work,
money, and the world of the marketplace.

11.

CARL A. DEGLER, AT ODDS, WOMEN AND THE FAMILY INAMERICA: FROM THE
66 (1980).
See PHILLIP ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY

REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT

12.

(Robert Baldick trans., 1962). Aries chronicles the construction of a modem notion
of childhood, beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See id. at 33-59. In
the feudal world, childhood ended with infancy at about age seven. The extension
occurred earlier for boys than for girls, who, until the end of the seventeenth century,
were expected to marry by about age 12. See id. at 331-32. Aries described Wagner's
Siegfried as the "first typical adolescent of modem times." Id. at 30.
13. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
LIFE

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 235-37 (1985).

In the colonial period, fathers had an

"unlimited right to the custody of their minor legitimate children," who were considered
assets of their fathers' estates. Id. at 235.
In fact, divorce was uncommon before the nineteenth century. For instance, the
first divorce in South Carolina was not ordered until 1868. See MASON, supra note 9, at
15. Even more, custody disputes were rare. Mary Ann Mason reports anecdotal
evidence that even where divorce was available, some women may have avoided
divorce, fearing the loss of their children. See id. at 17. Other women involved in
divorce may not have requested custody, certain that the request would be denied. See
id.
14. See, e.g., Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 101 (N.Y. 1840)
(granting custody to mother, declaring "the law of nature has given to her an attachment
for her infant offspring which no other relative will be likely to possess in equal
degree"). Not coincidentally, at about the same time, children became unimportant to
economic productivity. See ZELIZER, supra note 10, at 5-6.
15.

See GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at 248-54.
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The image of family around which nineteenth century custody law
developed remained central to the culture for well over the next century
and a half. Only in the last several decades of the twentieth century did6
alternative images gain widespread social and legal acceptance.1
Challenges to the traditional family during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries occurred, but were contained. 7 Ironically, the
traditional family, constructed in the 150 years following the start of the
Industrial Revolution, seemed most securely entrenched in the decade
and a half following World War II, just before it began visibly to
collapse as the single standard against which Americans judged the
moral worth of domestic matters.
Essential to the alteration of the family in the last part of the
twentieth century was a widespread redefinition of family members.
First, and most definitively, was the redefinition of adults within
families as autonomous individuals connected insofar as they chose to
be, but no further. 8 When the law responded to this new understanding
of family members, it did so with remarkable speed and unanimity. For
instance, within a decade and a half, as part of the so-called "divorce
revolution" of the 1970s, every state altered its divorce law to provide
for some form of no-fault divorce."' As a result, divorce was, in large
part, transformed from a moral matter to a contractual matter.
This change reflected a transformation in understandings of
spouses from a holistic unit to one composed of two separate
autonomous individuals.20 Moreover, beginning in the early 1970s, state
16. See, e.g., Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family, in 5
A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 539 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds. & Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1991) (defining 1960s as watershed in demography of American
family).
17. Sometimes attempts to contain alterations in family matters were draconian.
Arguably, the fury of the response indicated the strength of the challenge. So, for
instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century, laws were enacted widely that
defined abortion and contraception as crimes. Abortion was prohibited as early as 1820;
contraception was widely criminalized in the 1870s. See GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at
175-78.
18. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994) (analyzing differences between
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), as reflecting increasing readiness of society and law to predicate family relations
on autonomy of individual actors within family settings rather than on holism of familial
units).
19. Before the divorce revolution, grounds for divorce included such behavior as
adultery, desertion, and absence long enough to constitute a presumption of death. See
LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-07 (2d ed. 1985).
20. That change is indicated transparently in Eisenstadt where the Court declared
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courts began to recognize and enforce antenuptial agreements in
contemplation of divorce. Previously, such agreements were dismissed
by courts as violative of public policy.2 ' Family law, in its increasing
willingness to enforce cohabitation agreements between parties
choosing not to marry, further indicated that the spousal relationship
was no longer defined exclusively through a set of status-based rights
and obligations.2
Thus, family law has widely replaced rules formulated in the
nineteenth century with new rules that recognize adults within families
as autonomous individuals, free to design the terms of their
relationships. In this, family law reflects society.
III.

TRANSFORMED UNDERSTANDINGS OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD

Images of childhood, basic to understandings of the traditional
family, also begin to dim. In part, this follows from the transformation
unconstitutional a Massachusetts birth control statute that prohibited the distribution of
contraception to unmarried people. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-55. Seven years
earlier in Griswold the Court invalidated a birth control law that prohibited the
distribution of contraception to married couples. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. In
Eisenstadt, the Court firmly concluded that the right at stake attached to individuals as
such and not to people within a marital relationship. The Court wrote:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
21. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (taking judicial
notice of increase in ratio of marriage to divorce in recognizing antenuptial agreement);
Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982); Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141
(1998). Even more, in enforcing antenuptial agreements courts rely on standard contract
law principles. See Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 511 (1988). States generally enforce
antenuptial agreements if they (1) are free from fraud and overreaching, (2) reflect a full
and fair disclosure by and between the parties of their respective assets, and in some
states, (3) are not unconscionable as to property division or spousal support. See id. at
512-16.
22. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (enforcing nonmeretricious contract between domestic partners); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154,
1157 (N.Y. 1980) (upholding express contract between unmarried cohabitants).
Legislatures have been similarly willing to accept cohabitation agreements. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 1990) (Cohabitation: Property and Financial
Agreements).
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of families that has accompanied the reconceptualization of adults
within families as autonomous individuals. As families have become
more variable, and more transient, it has become harder to sustain an
image of childhood that assumes that children should remain dependent
and indulged for almost two decades. In part, other forces within the
culture, only indirectly connected to the transformation of family, have
affected social understandings of childhood 3
A. From Treasured Children to Adult-Child

Throughout most of American history, children's welfare was
closely identified with the welfare of families.2 4 For the most part,
protecting children meant protecting families as social units within
which children were understood as subservient to, and as obligated to
respect and obey, their parents. 2- As relations between adults within
families have become more malleable and more transient, the traditional
model becomes harder to sustain. Thus, increasingly society and the
law seek to protect children outside, as well as inside, of families. At
the same time, childhood itself is reconstructed increasingly to provide
for autonomous, independent children.
Neil Postman describes a broad amalgamation of childhood and
21
adulthood. 26 Children, separated from adults throughout most of
23. Childhood has been dramatically altered, for instance, in response to electronic
media. Even before the age of the Internet, Neil Postman suggested that television
eroded the barriers that separated the world of children from that of adults. See NEIL
POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD (1982). "Television . . . is the
consummate egalitarian medium of communication, surpassing oral language itself....
The most obvious and general effect of this situation is to eliminate one of the principal
differences between childhood and adulthood." Id. at 84.
24. The law's interest in families and in children's welfare has been distinct since
the late nineteenth century. See GROSSBERG, supra note 13, at 301 (noting appearance
of child welfare legislation in late nineteenth century as distinct from legislation
regulating families). However, the two continue to be correlated closely by analysts.
25. Non-mainstream families-for example, single-parent families, families with
homosexual or lesbian partners, and multi-generational families-have frequently been
criticized precisely on the ground that these families do not serve children as adequately
as do mainstream families. At present, such families, no longer statistically deviant,
continue to be criticized by those anxious to stem the transformation of the traditional
family. A recent illustration of this sort of criticism is PATRICK F. FAGAN, THE
BREAKDOWN OF THE FAMILY: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN AND AMERICAN

SOCIETY (1998). Fagan identifies divorce and children born outside marriage as the two
"widespread patterns" weakening the American family. Alienation attendant to divorce,
he asserts, "weakens both.., children's ability to value commitment to the family and
(even more so) their ability to commit themselves to others." Id.
26. See POSTMAN, supra note 23, at 99.
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American history, in dress, in leisure activities, in social predilections
and sophistication, and in spheres of knowledge, are increasingly privy
to the secrets of adult life, and are increasingly indistinguishable from
adults in the clothes they wear, the games they play, and the
entertainment they prefer. Thus, little children and their parents wear
identical shoes and clothing. And children's games, once enjoyed
without spectators and exacting rules, have become organized,
competitive sports. This pattern is especially evident in advertising and
on television. Postman describes an advertisement for Ivory Soap that
appeared widely a number of years ago:
[W]e are shown two women identified as a mother and daughter. The viewers
are then challenged to guess which is the mother, which the daughter, both of
whom appear to be in their late twenties and more or less interchangeable. I
take this commercial to be an uncommonly explicit piece of evidence
supporting the view that the differences between adults and children are
disappearing.2 7

Postman suggests that in the age of television, the stages of life have
been reduced to three: infancy, adult-child, and senility."
How completely childhood, and children with it, will disappear
remains unclear. But, it is clear that the period of adolescence has
expanded during the last three or four decades. A stage that included
thirteen through eighteen or nineteen-year olds at the middle of the
twentieth century, now includes people as young as nine or ten and
people well into their twenties. Young children date, organize and
attend school dances, compete ferociously in athletics and in scholastics,
and, through television and the Internet, are fully conversant with the
world of adult "secrets., 29 At the other end, people remain dependent on
parental support well into their twenties; they attend school longer and
live at home longer in a dependent state. As a result, they are
segregated from adult jobs and responsibilities.
Even more, people

27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See Hymowitz, supra note 2, at A22 (describing increasing sexuality, drug use,
suicide and criminal behavior among children in elementary school); see also POSTMAN,
supra note 23, at 83-85 (considering role of television in presenting world of adult
secrets to children); Peter Applebome, No Room for Children in a World of Little Adults,
N.Y. TIMES., May 10, 1998, § 4, at 1 (noting competitiveness of children's
contemporary games).
30.

See STEPHANIECOONTZ,THE WAY WE REALLY ARE 13 (1997).
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older than thirty delight in activities once considered appropriate for
children alone."
B. The Law's Response: Change and Ambivalence
The law, reflecting the society, is confused about the scope and
meaning of childhood and of the parent-child relationship. Within the
last several decades, the law has effectively redefined children in a
number of contexts as autonomous individuals. In other cases, however,
the law preserves more traditional understandings of children and of
childhood.
This confusion is reflected in a series of Supreme Court decisions
implicating the parameters of childhood and of the parent-child
relationship, as well as in a variety of family law cases decided by state
courts, and in the law's response to juvenile offenders. These responses
reflect the existence of three distinct, even contradictory, models
through which to consider the status and rights of children. These can
be referred to as the Traditional Model, the Mediating Model, and the
Individualist Model.32
Much like the larger society, the Supreme Court has been anxious
to preserve childhood as a distinct status and to preserve traditional
understandings of the parent-child bond. But, it has also been willing,
in at least some contexts, to reconceptualize children as autonomous
individuals. For the most part, this willingness has not suggested a
broad rejection of traditional understandings of children in familial
contexts. Rather, it acknowledges changes in the American family that
necessitate granting increased autonomy to some children.33
31. Adults attend camp and return to school. Beyond this, adults of virtually all
ages resort to drugs and cosmetics to help themselves look and act younger. One article,
featured on the front page of a Sunday New York Times edition of the Week in Review
explained:
Children stave off adulthood by staying in school longer or coming home to live
with parents. Boomers go to fantasy baseball camps and chatter about what they'll
do when they grow up. Men in their 50's turn back the clock with Propecia or
Viagra, and senior citizens expect a life of vigor and engagement that defies
conventional notions of old age.
Applebome, supra note 29, at 1.
32. These models are explored in much greater depth in Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate
of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-ChildRelationship, 61 ALB. L.
REv. 345 (1997).
33. I am grateful to Professor Martin Guggenheim of the New York University
School of Law for suggesting that the Court's jurisprudence involving children in the
1970s was primarily instrumental, and had little express significance for the status of
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Assumptions behind the Traditional Model undergird two cases
decided in the 1920s. Both involved disputes between parents and the
state about the limits of the state's right to control the character of
public schooling.34 This model assumes a domestic arena within which
parents exercise almost complete control over their children.35 In this
model, children are dependent, immature, and voiceless.36
Fifty years later, in three cases decided in the 1970s, the Court
reaffirmed much of the rhetoric, if not the essential message, of the
Traditional Model, but now with significant hesitation.
The Court, in
effect, attributed its hesitation in the 1970s to concerns about the
consequences of the transformation of the traditional family for the
character of the parent-child relationship and for the meaning of
children. I also thank Professor Guggenheim for referring me to Robert Burt's article
analyzing that jurisprudence. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979
SuP. CT. REv. 329 (1979). Clearly, Professor Burt was correct in suggesting that the
Court was largely concerned with exercising social control over children. Whatever the
Court's express aims, however, its jurisprudence in cases such as In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), did redefine children or, more
accurately, reflected (and thus encouraged) a wider tendency within the society to
redefine children. That tendency created additional questions and concerns about
society's ability to "control" children.
Historically, society and law have not necessarily refrained from trying to
establish social control over members of a group, defined, in theory, as autonomous.
Clearly, such efforts are self-contradictory. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
illustrates such an effort. In Lochner, the Court stressed the autonomy of workers vis-Avis their employers precisely in order to ensure the continued ability of employers to
control workers. See infra note 104 (considering implications of Lochner).
34. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (declaring
unconstitutional Oregon statute requiring public, as opposed to private or parochial,
schooling); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional
Nebraska statute prohibiting use of any language except English in elementary
education);.
35. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (describing children as under parental control);
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 ("Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life .... ); see also
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992).
36. See Woodhouse, supra note 35, at 1001 (describing the reverse side of family
privacy and parental control as the "child's voicelessness, objectification, and isolation
from the community").
37. See generally Bellotti v. Baird 443 US. 622 (1979) (invalidating Massachusetts
statute that required pregnant minors seeking to abort to seek parental permission);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding Georgia statute that allowed parents to
have their unwilling children committed to state mental hospitals); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating conviction of Amish parents under Wisconsin
compulsory school-attendance law and holding law unconstitutional at least in reference
to Amish high school children).
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childhood.38 Taken as a group, these three cases illustrate a distinct
model of childhood (the Mediating Model). This model, because
internally contradictory, appears inherently fragile.39
The assumptions informing two of the three cases, Wisconsin and
Parham, are closer to the assumptions of the Traditional Model than to
those of the Individualist Model. The assumptions of the third, Bellotti,
are closer to those of the Individualist Model. However, each decision
acknowledges the conflicting assumptions undergirding the others, and
thus, as a group, these cases delineate a set of contradictory assumptions
and uncertainties within society and law about. the scope of childhood
and of the parent-child relationship. 40 These cases reaffirm the
presumption on which the Court's familial decisions rested in the
1920s,4 that childhood is special and that children are best served
through preservation of strong parental authority. 42 However, in the
1970s another, inconsistent message appeared as well. Bellotti and
Parham, at least in theory, recognize certain liberty interests to which
children are entitled under the Constitution.43 Even more, in Bellotti, the
Court declared that the preservation of parental authority does not
always serve children's welfare. 4 Thus, an understanding of childhood,
firmly embedded in constitutional jurisprudence during the 1920s
began, by the 1970s, to founder, though not completely to disappear.
38. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (noting, without comment, competing
theories about most effective way to educate children); Parham,442 U.S. at 602 (1979)
(noting parents sometimes act against best interests of their children).
39. In fact, the Mediating Model has now been significant to society and to the law
for well over two decades. Arguably, the apparent stability of this model reflects only
the continuing transformation of the American family away from a single ("traditional")
model of domestic life.
40. For instance, Belloti acknowledges the right of pregnant girls, anxious to
terminate their pregnancies, to constitutional protection from parental veto. However,
the decision also notes the fragility and vulnerability of children and the duty of parents
to educate and socialize their children. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38. Parham
upholds a Georgia statute allowing parents to arrange a "voluntary commitment" of a
child to a state mental institution, but notes that children have substantial liberty
interests. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-02. In a dissenting opinion in Yoder, Justice
Douglas notes the contradiction between recognizing parental power over children's
education and recognizing the rights of children as "persons" under the Constitution.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. See generally Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
42. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638 (proclaiming that "[it is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents ....).
43. See id. at 643; Parham, 442 U.S. at 600 (recognizing child's "substantial
liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily").
44. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-44.
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In yet other cases, not directly implicating the dimensions of the
parent-child relationship, the Court assumed an Individualist Model of
childhood in defining children as autonomous individuals, entitled to
constitutional rights previously precluded to children by their status.45
protection to
In 1967, the Court, in In re Gault, extended constitutional
• 46
The Court's clearly
children involved in delinquency proceedings.
stated intention was to protect children,47 not to conceptualize them
anew. In fact, however, the language of In re Gault is the language of
individuality and freedom,48 and to that extent, cases such as In re Gault
and In re Winship,49 which followed, three years later, prepared the way
for contemporary changes in the juvenile justice system.
Three decades after In re Gault, Congress began to consider
seriously a response to juvenile crime already familiar within state
legislatures. 0 In 1997, the House passed a bill, and the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported favorably on a similar bill, that proposed holding
many juvenile offenders responsible for their behavior much as the law
These bills assumed a
holds adults responsible for theirs.
reconceptualization of childhood for at least some children.
Similarly, state courts deciding family law issues have recognized
45. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (involving First Amendment claim of high school students); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1(1967).
46. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. See id. at 17-21.
48. See id. at 20. "Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation
of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which
defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may
exercise." Id.
49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding 12-year-old child entitled to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt before being confined on charge of stealing).
50. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071.1 (West 1996) (lowering age at which
child may be subjected to waiver hearing from 14 to 12 with regard to any crime, and
doing away with minimum age altogether with regard to child charged with one of seven
especially serious crimes, including, for example, murder, rape and assault); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1993) (asserting that youth should "be held
accountable for their offenses").
51. Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997, H.R. 3, 105th Cong. (1997). The bill was
passed in May 1997. It provided that most juveniles over 14 and some under that age be
prosecuted as adults if alleged to have committed a crime which, if committed by an
adult, would be a serious violent felony or a drug offense. See id. § 101(b)(1). The
Senate Judiciary Committee approved a similar bill two months later. Violent and
Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997). Neither bill became
law during the tenure of the 105th Congress, but each bill reflects an important trend
within society regarding the proposed treatment and understanding of juvenile
offenders.
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children's autonomy in particular cases in recent years. In custody
cases, children's voices are routinely respected, though usually, in
theory, as part of the court's parens patriae concern with children's
"best interests."5 2 But beyond this, a few courts have granted children
unprecedented power as autonomous individuals to define the terms of
their custody or parentage. 3
Thus, a curiosity appears. The law and society are most ready to
treat children as autonomous individuals both in cases directly
implicating the contours of the domestic arena and in cases involving
children "in trouble." The first type of case might appear to be the last
social domain within which express redefinitions of childhood would
occur, and the second type of case involves children, apparently least
ready to assume responsibilities associated with autonomous
individuality in that these are children most seriously in need of adult
help and guidance.
IV. ADULT-CHILDREN: IN FAMILIES AND IN PRISONS

Both types of cases (those giving children the astonishing right to
design the terms of their own parentage and those of juvenile offenders,
less and less often distinguished from their adult counterparts) entail
images of children that conflict markedly with traditional images of
indulged children, secure in nurturing, protective families. Moreover,
the law's willingness to redefine both groups of children as autonomous
individuals reflects vast changes that have largely redesigned the
parameters of familial relationships within the last few decades.
Beyond these similarities, however, there are crucial differences in
the two types of cases. Within the familial context, the extension of
autonomy to children within troubled families has largely been aimed at
preserving the possibility of family, even if not particular families. In
marked contrast, recent redefinitions of children within the system of
criminal justice assume the absence of family and the incorrigibility of
52. Some state statutes require judges presiding at custody cases to consider the
child's preference. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510, 1514 (West 1991 & Supp.)
(giving children 12 and older right to select own guardians).
53. See, e.g., Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla.Cir.
Ct. July 20, 1992) (granting young boy standing to challenge his biological mother's
legal maternity), rev'd sub nom. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1993); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.
18, 1993) (granting adolescent girl right to pursue parental termination petition on her
own behalf). These cases are considered more fully infra in notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
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the children involved. Moreover, public images of juvenile offenders
stress their absolute separation from family and, even more, from
virtually all other forms of community.54
A. Autonomy Within Dysfunctional Families
In recent years, family law courts, while generally reluctant to
abandon traditional understandings of children and of childhood, have
begun to view children as autonomous individuals having independent
rights and choices.
A few courts, entertaining cases in which
adolescents or younger children petitioned for changes in their
parentage or custody, have recognized the children involved as
autonomous individuals. For example, in the early 1990s, two Florida
courts granted children (one a teenager, one even younger) standing to
challenge their parentage.
In the first case, a Florida trial court granted standing to elevenyear old Gregory Kingsley to challenge his biological mother's
maternity and to request that his foster parents be named his legal
parents in the biological mother's stead." Judge Kirk, writing for the
trial court, recognized Gregory's autonomy and proclaimed: "[T]he
right of privacy set forth in the Florida Constitution extends to every
natural person and... minors, as natural persons, are entitled to the
same privacy rights which are afforded persons who have reached the
age of majority. 56
In the second case, a Florida trial court allowed Kimberly Mays,
then a young teenager, to challenge a stipulation regarding her
parentage.57 Although the decision was not overruled, the unusual facts
54. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
55. Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. C192-5127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July
20, 1992), overruled by Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
The trial court decision, which was widely publicized and debated, changed the scope of
public considerations about the inevitability of a child's parentage from the child's own
perspective. Gregory Kingsley's story became the subject of a made-for-television
movie, and the boy appeared on talk shows in the years surrounding his legal battle. See
Andrew L. Shapiro, Children in Court-The New Crusade, NATION, Sept. 27, 1993, at
301.
56. Gregory K., 1992 WL 551488, at *1 (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193
(Fla. 1989)). See, e.g., Susan Campbell, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 17, 1993, at 3
(describing Gregory's lawsuit as one "to divorce his biological parents"); What They
Said, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Sept. 30, 1993, at 2 (asking whether child should
have right to "divorce" parents); Pat Wingert et al., Irreconcilable Differences,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 84.
57. See Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *1 (Fla.Cir. Ct.
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of the case'8 lessen its precedential value. Incidentally, Kimberly's legal
battle, like Gregory's, received intense public attention.59
In Peregood v. Cosmides,6° a Florida
S 61 appeals court permitted a
young boy to challenge his own adoption. Similarly, in In re Pima
County Juvenile Action No. S-113432,6' an Arizona appellate court

granted four children the right to petition for termination of their
father's parental rights.63 The latter decision expressly recognized the
law's inconsistency in viewing children as autonomous for some
purposes and as dependent and incapable in other contexts. 64 The court
proclaimed:
Children may not marry, drive a car, join the armed services or consent to
surgery without the consent of a parent or guardian because the legislature has
determined these acts require a certain level of maturity and capacity. The
same cannot be said of a severance proceeding. MaturityS 65has nothing to do
with a child's interest in the substance of such a proceeding.

In effect, the court dissociated a child's maturity from the child's
Aug. 18, 1993). The case involved a complicated and sad story that commenced when
two baby girls were switched at birth. See id. at *2. One girl (raised by Ernest and
Regina Twigg, Kimberly's biological parents) died during childhood. See Mays v.
Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989). The Twiggs discovered during the
child's final illness that she was not their biological child. See id. Hospital records
revealed that Kimberly was the "only other white female in occupancy at Hardee
Memorial Hospital at the time of Arlena's [the dead child's] birth." Id. at 242. They
then attempted to gain custody of Kimberly. See Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *1. A
stipulation was reached that allowed Robert Mays to retain custody of the child he had
raised and that granted visitation to the Twiggs. See id. Later, relationships among the
parties deteriorated, and Kimberly asked to end all legal bonds between herself and her
biological parents. See id. at *2. The court then allowed Kimberly to seek termination
of any connection with the Twiggs. See id. at *3.
58. See Mays, 543 So. 2d at 242.
59. Kimberly's story quickly became the subject of a made-for-television movie
and of a book. See Eric Harrison, Court Will Not Force Girl to See Birth Parents, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al.
60. 663 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
61. See id. at 666. The court concluded that the adoption, arranged by the boy's
unmarried mother and father, did not serve the child's best interests. See id. at 669. The
precedential value of the case is limited due to what the court described as the "unusual
and unique facts." Id. at 668.
62. 872 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
63. The court, concluding that there was no difference between a child's being
party to a severance petition brought by someone else (such as the other parent) and a
child's initiating such a petition, granted the children's petition to terminate their
father's parental rights. See id. at 1245-46.
64. See id. at 1243.
65. Id.
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right (and, thus, at least by implication, capacity) to challenge his or her
parentage. In re Pima County is especially remarkable in that the
children's mother was available to commence the action. In fact, she
later joined the proceedings. 66 In re Pima County acknowledged the
collapse of a traditional familial morality, defined through hierarchical
relationships grounded in natural truth, quite as much as it
acknowledged the autonomy of the four children involved in the case.
The 1994 guidelines of the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers (AAML) 67 suggest a more widespread willingness to treat

children older than eleven as capable of directing their own
representation in custody cases occasioned by parental divorce. The
AAML Standards presume that children below twelve are "impaired,"
and, thus, are incapable of directing their own representation, but that
children twelve and older are "unimpaired. 6
In establishing this
difference, the AAML relied expressly on Supreme Court precedents
69
that granted constitutional rights to "children as young as twelve."
In short, decisions that grant children standing to effect their own
choices, such as In re Pima County, Gregory K., Mays, and Peregood,
suggest a redefinition of childhood that has followed from the erosion of
the moral universe once associated with traditional family life.
However, each of these redefinitions was made so that the child
involved could redesign his or her familial relationships and, thereby,
create a more loving, successful familial constellation than the one from
which the child sought to escape. In this regard, the implications of
these decisions are deeply contradictory. The courts redefined a notion
of childhood, central to understandings of the traditional family, so as to
safeguard the possibility that particular children would have more
loving and stable families.
B. Autonomous Children Within the Criminal Sphere
In sharp contrast, recent changes and proposed changes in the
66. See In re Pima County, 872 P.2d at 1243.
67. See generally Representing Children: Standardsfor Attorneys and Guardians
Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1
(1995) [hereinafter AAML Standards].
68. The term "impaired" was taken from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.14 (1994).

69. AAML Standards,supra note 67, Rule 2.2 cmt. (citing Ohio v. Akron Reprod.
Health Ctr., 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 421 U.S. 678 (1977); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community

Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
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response of the law to juvenile offenders make no pretense of protecting
children or of safeguarding life within families. These changes have
dismantled a model for understanding and treating juvenile offenders
instituted about a century ago. That earlier model assumed that juvenile
offenders should be protected and rehabilitated, rather than punished by
the law. 70 The system was constructed around familial metaphors and
was aimed, at least in theory, at protecting and rehabilitating young
offenders. Howard Snyder of the National Center for Juvenile Justice in
Pittsburgh summarized the intent of a separate juvenile justice system:
"Juvenile courts are not just dealing with kids and crime; they are
dealing with families and communities....

Adult courts are there to

punish; juvenile courts are there to be parents to the kids, and that
includes all the things parents do., 7' The recent trend of treating young
offenders as adults redefines juveniles. In consequence, familial
metaphors become inappropriate, or simply irrelevant.
Shifts in social understandings of children, reflected in cases
decided several decades ago, such as Bellotti v. Baird,72 in the family
law context, and In re Gault,73 in the criminal context, facilitated, but
did not presage such recent shifts in understandings of juvenile
offenders. In re Gault and its progeny have been widely interpretedand in significant part, accurately-to suggest little beyond a need to
correct inadequacies in the juvenile court system.74 In In re Gault, the

Court extended constitutional protection to children in delinquency
proceedings. Neither that case nor the related cases that followed,
jettisoned the juvenile court system. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,75
70. Beginning in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, a separate court system for
juveniles was constructed throughout the United States. See Jacqueline Cuncannan,
Note, Only When They're Bad: The Rights and Responsibilities of Our Children, 51
WASH. U. J. UPB. & CoNTEMP.L. 273, 279 n.30 (1997) (citing Committee on Child
Psychiatry, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, How Old is Old Enough?, The
Ages of Rights and Responsibilities 39 (1989)); see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909).
71. Quoted in T.R. Goldman, Senate's Juvenile Crime Bill Gets Bashed from All
Sides, TEx. LAW., Mar. 9, 1998, at 4.
72. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supranotes 33-44 and accompanying text.
73. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. Bruce C. Hafen interpreted In re Gault and the cases that followed it, including
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), to have preserved a traditional conception of
childhood. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REv.
605, 633-34 (1976). Hafen wrote in 1976: "In the juvenile justice context, then, the
Court has evidently not rejected the validity of a legal minority status, although it is
willing to provide constitutional protection against the abuse of that status." Id. at 635.
75. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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decided in 1971, the Court refused to recognize a right to a jury trial for
juvenile offenders, and expressly reaffirmed the value of a special
juvenile court system.76 Moreover, the Court in In re Gault did not
expressly redefine children as adults, nor did it explicitly favor that end.
In contrast, ,the message underlying more recent proposals and
amendments that would, or do, treat large categories of juvenile
offenders (based on age or on the seriousness of the offenses involved)
as adult criminals differ qualitatively from the message underlying cases
such as In re Gault and Winship.
However, In re Gault did, in fact, redefine certain children for
certain purposes as autonomous individuals, and, at least to that extent,
In re Gault is among the Supreme Court decisions, rendered in the
1960s and 1970s, that foreshadowed profound shifts at the end of the
twentieth century in the law's understanding of children, in delinquency,
and in other contexts." Thus, recent changes in the law, and suggestions
by lawmakers, regarding the law's treatment of juvenile offenders,
depend on, though they do not follow inevitably from, the express
attribution by society and law of autonomous individuality to certain
children, in cases such as In re Gault. Only because children are no
longer widely and clearly distinguished morally and psychologically
from adults, have society and the law become willing to entertain
proposals to hold some children fully responsible for their conduct.
For example, many states have amended their laws in recent years
so that more and more juvenile offenders are being handled by the adult
criminal justice system.78 Since the first half of the twentieth century,
state laws permitted juvenile offenders to be transferred to adult
criminal courts as the result of waiver hearings,79 which occurred on a
case-by-case basis. Increasingly waiver (or "transfer") of juveniles to
adult court has become automatic for various groups of children.0 In
addition, the age at which children can be transferred to adult court has
been consistently lowered by state legislatures in recent years."
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 534.
See Hafen, supra note 74, at 633-34.
See HowARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIcTiMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 85 (1995); Richard E.
Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on
Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 713-16.
79. See SNYDER & SIcKmuND, supra note 78, at 85.
80. See Redding, supra note 78, at 715; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 78, at
85.
81. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.071.1 (1996); see also Cuncannan, supra note
70, at 273-74 (analyzing alterations in Missouri law on juvenile waiver hearings). The
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Both the Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997,82 passed by the

House, and the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Act of 1997,83
reported out of committee, but stalled in the Senate, represent a similar
trend. Neither bill became law," but both suggest a startling readiness
to reform the law's treatment of children involved in crime. Both bills
proposed reducing the age at which juveniles should be treated as adults
in federal prosecutions.85 In addition, these bills proposed establishing
incentive grants to the states to use for improving their juvenile justice
systems. Receipt of these grants would depend on the state's meeting a
number of conditions, including trying certain juveniles as adults and
treating juvenile offenders' records more like the records of adult
offenders.86 The intent and substance of both bills conflict transparently
with a system of juvenile justice, imagined through familial metaphors,
and aimed, at least in theory, at protecting and rehabilitating young
offenders.
C. Comparing Categoriesof Autonomous Children
Both the law's willingness to grant broad autonomy to children
within dysfunctional families, and recent redefinitions (and proposed
redefinitions) of juvenile offenders as largely indistinguishable from
their adult counterparts, have been facilitated by more far-reaching
cultural shifts in the scope of childhood. That shift, in turn, is part of a
broad social transformation in the meaning of familial relationships.
Increasingly, relations among family members have become open to

1996 Missouri statute changed the age at which a child could be subject to a waiver
hearing for any crime from 14 to 12. See id. at 274 n.7. The new law also makes waiver
hearings mandatory with regard to a number of especially serious crimes such as
murder, rape, and assault. See id.
A few states do not limit transfer at all by age or by type of crime. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060 (Michie 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237 (Michie 1996);
see also Cuncannan, supra note 70, at 274-75.
82. H.R. 3, 105th Cong. (1997).
83. S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997).
84. Either bill, or a version thereof, could be re-introduced in the 106th Congress
when it convenes in 1999.
85. See, e.g., H.R. 3, 105th Cong. § 101(b)(1) (providing, with limited exception,
that "a juvenile [over 14 years old] shall be prosecuted as an adult ... if the juvenile is
alleged to have committed an act.., which if committed by an adult would be a serious
violent felony or a serious drug offense").
86. See Tom Begich, Commentary, CongressionalBills on Juvenile Crime Would
Trample States' Rights, WASH. TIMms, Dec. 31, 1997, at A16 (arguing imposition of
such conditions would interfere with states' rights).
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choice and negotiation and have, thereby, begun to resemble relations
within the marketplace.
As a result, the law is less and less firmly committed to traditional
visions of childhood. Yet, the response of society and the law to
children such as Gregory K. and Kimberly May 7 differ dramatically
from social and legal responses to children who commit crimes. In the
first set of cases,88 the law's response acknowledges the transformation
of the traditional family, in general, but it does so to fashion nurturant
families for particular children. With regard to juvenile offenders, in
contrast, recent social and legal proposals to treat such children as adults
presume that the traditional family has largely eroded, or at the least,
that it has eroded with regard to the children involved. Thus, in the first
situation, the law's response aims to reconstruct particular families in
order to provide children with loving parents. In these cases, the law
recognizes autonomy in order to preserve community. In its response to
juvenile offenders, however, the law no longer aims to preserve even the
illusion of inexorable, supportive bonds of a familial sort. Rather, its
response reflects the conclusion that such children are irremediably
unconnected to any form of community.
Thus, both the response of law to children within dysfunctional
families, and its response to children within the juvenile justice system,
depend on remarkable shifts in social understandings of childhood. Old
images of childhood survive, but new, conflicting images appear.
Children can now be understood as dependent and loving, or as
autonomous and unconnected, or as both at once. Beyond this,
however, an essential difference distinguishes the two responses. The
first defines children as autonomous in the effort to preserve traditional
moral categories and to safeguard familial bonds. The second defines
children as autonomous in the essentially desperate conclusion that,
with regard to the children in question at least, traditional moral
categories have little, or no, continuing relevance.
V. IMAGES OF YOUNG OFFENDERS: DIMENSIONS OF AUTONOMY

During most of the twentieth century, juvenile offenders were
87. Both Gregory and Kimberly asked courts for the right to select their own
parentage. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (summarizing Gregory K. v.
Ralph K., No. C192-5157, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 20, 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) and Twigg v. Mays,
No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993)).
88. See supra Part III.A.
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widely depicted as a product of disordered moral categories, but not as a
product of an essentially amoral universe 89 For instance, juvenile crime
was long attributed to the "breakdown" of the traditional family. 90
However, since the late nineteenth century, the juvenile justice system
has reflected the assumption that children, even if deprived of adequate
parental protection, could be protected by state, and other, custodians.
That assumption wanes.
A. PopularImages of Juvenile Offenders

The Senate Judiciary Committee Report, approving the Violent and
Repeat Juvenile Offender Act, refers to "profound societal changes,"
including:
an explosion in the number of single parent households, the prevalence of two
wage-earners in two-parent households, and the pervasiveness of coarse and
destructive sexual and violent material available in popular culture. The
changes in society have been reflected in the changed nature of juvenile crime
89. Parental responsibility statutes are no exception. These statutes, which have
existed for most of the twentieth century, in one form or another, hold parents
responsible for the criminal offenses of their children. See Paul W. Schmidt, Note,
Dangerous Children and the Regulated Family: The Shifting Focus of Parental
Responsibility Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 675-76 (1998). One variety of these
statutes, common since the start of the twentieth century, holds parents responsible for
endangering a child or for neglecting a child such that the child exhibits offensive
misconduct. See id. at 676-77. Another variety, promulgated within the last decade,
holds parents accountable for their children's bad acts. See id. at 677. This second
variety of parental responsibility statute, in particular, assumes the breakdown of the
nuclear family. See id. These statutes also assume the state is incapable of substituting
satisfactorily for the neglectful parent(s). See Schmidt, supra. Thus, holding the
parent(s) accountable serves to vindicate the state as much as to punish the parent(s). It
does not serve to benefit the children involved. As Paul Schmidt explained, these laws,
especially in their new guise, "combine an emphasis on risk management with a focus
on controlling dangerous populations, where juveniles are the dangerous population and
their crime rate is the risk." Id. at 683.
90. See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the TwentyFirst Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2002 (1993) (noting costs for "the family
justice system" of "[t]he dramatic transformation of family life during the last thirty
years."); Mark Soler, Interagency Services in Juvenile Justice Systems, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENCY

134, 139-40

(Ira M.

Schwartz ed., 1992) (noting importance of and describing program aimed at
strengthening family ties within families of juvenile offenders); Mark R. Lipschutz,
Runaways in History, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: DELINQUENCY
AND DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR 34, 45 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1991) (noting correlation
in 1960s, as in earlier periods in American history, between "family discontinuity" and
juvenile runaways, and noting numerous studies showing link between runaways and
families with "deviations from the intact nuclear family") (footnote omitted).
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and delinquency.91

The original name of the House bill that became the Juvenile
Crime Control Act of 1997 reflects the intensity of the perception that
juvenile offenders, in their very being, are almost entirely incompatible
with communal association.
That bill, when introduced by
Representative William McCollum of Florida was called the Violent
Youth PredatorAct.9
A more dramatic example of the same perception of juvenile
offenders as inherently, almost inescapably alone, is provided by public,
and especially media, portraits of a series of children, apprehended in
five unrelated episodes of shootings in American public schools in an
eight month period in late 1997 and early 1998. 9' The children
involved, all boys, most of them teenagers, were widely portrayed as
unconnected to their communities or homes, even when those
communities and homes seemed comfortable and inviting. The portraits
are especially striking in the case of a few of the boys, who grew up in
homes described as loving and in communities, marked in media
presentations only by being unremarkable. 94 For example, fifteen-year91. S. REP. No. 105-108 (1997).
92. See Richard Lacayo, Nation: Teen Crime Congress Wants to Crack Down on
Juvenile Offenders. But is Throwing Teens into Adult Courts-andAdult Prisons-the
Best Way?, TIME, July 21, 1997, at 26. McCollum apparently changed the bill's title in
response to claims that the term "predator" was dehumanizing. See id.
93. The five shootings occurred in southern and western towns. Public reaction
was especially interesting insofar as several of the children held responsible were
reported to have had caring parents and to have been raised in prototypic small,
American towns. See Timothy Egan, What Makes Kids Kill? Student Shootings Share
Similar Threads, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 21, 1998, at Fl. The five shootings
occurred in Pearl, Mississippi, in October 1997, see Butch John & Mario Rossilli,
ProsecutorsHope to Try Boyette by Mid-August, JACKSON-CLARION LEDGER, June 16,
1998 at 1, Paducah, Kentucky, in December 1997, see Tom Zucco, Shooters in the
School Yard, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 14, 1998, at IF, Jonesboro, Arkansas, in
March 1998, see id., Edinboro, Pennsylvania, in April 1998, see id., and in Springfield,
Oregon, in May 1998, see id. Other, similar shootings occurred in preceding years. For
instance, in February 1996, a 14-year-old shot a group of classmates at his middleschool in Alaska. See Egan, supra.
94. Life Magazine, reporting on the May 1998 shooting at Thurston High School
in Springfield, Oregon, by one of the school's students, declared:
It can happen here. Here in Springfield. Thirty-five states have a Springfield. The
one in Oregon is an all-American town. A small town, a ranch house town, the
town people choose to live in so their children can be safe. There are Welcome
Wagons and prayer breakfasts. Parents teach their children the important things.
To work hard. To pray hard. To be good sports.
Claudia Glenn Dowling, High School Heroes in Springfield, Oregon, Teenagers Under
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old Kipland Kinkel, who murdered both his parents before killing or
wounding two dozen schoolmates, was widely reported to have had
loving parents.95 The boy, however, was portrayed as incapable of
participating in communal bonds because of some flaw deep within his
own being. One popular news magazine explained that "to know" the
boy's thoughts on the day of the murders "is surely to see the face of
Satan." 96 Other media reported that the mother of the boy "wondered"
whether he "has a conscience, like other people."' 97
In general, the violent acts of these boys were attributed by public
media to something within the boys or to a marginal, perverted culture
of anonymity and violence, shared by these boys and other children like
them rather than to the neglect or abuse of their parents. The boys were
portrayed as "bad seeds," 98 infected by a "lethal virus," 99 "fledgling

Fire Do the Right Thing-and Do It With Amazing Grace, 21(8) LIFE MAG., July 1,
1998, at 52.
The article, focused around the heroic acts of several students who subdued the
murderous student, mingles images of adolescent heroes with images of adolescent
villains. After describing Springfield as prototypical, the article then explains that at
least some adolescents in the town are largely separate from all the details and images
that made the town an average community:
But teenagers don't really live in Springfield. They inhabit an adolescent
shadowland between childhood freedom and adult responsibility, between fantasy
and reality. In this dreamscape they can play the roles of hero, villain, victim. The
internal drama is so vivid they can hardly see through their eyes, even when gazing
into the mirror. Teenagers have secret lives.
Id.
Similarly, President Clinton, commenting publicly on the same shooting proclaimed:
Not to scare our people all across America or to trouble them, but everybody who
has looked at you knows that this is a good community that they'd be proud to live
in, and, therefore, it could happen anywhere. So what we have to try to do is to, all
of us, learn more about the people with whom we live and the kinds of signals that
are coming out.
The White House: Remarks by the President to the Families of Thurston High School
Community, M2 Presswire, June 17, 1998, 1998 WL 12975267 (emphasis added).
95. See, e.g., Diane Dietz et. al, Kinkels Couldn't Block Son's Dark Side: Shooting
Charges Read Against Oregon Teen, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCE, June 17, 1998, at Al
(describing Kipland's parents, Faith and Bill Kinkel as "master teachers" who "spent
their lives in the company of teenagers," and who "gave every kid a chance"); Zucco,
supra note 93 (reporting that Kipland's "caring" parents had "tried therapy and home
schooling when their son kept getting in trouble").
96. John Cloud, Of Arns and the Boys: All Kids Battle Demons: Why Did These
Five Lose?, TIME, July 6, 1998, at 58.
97. Diane Dietz et al., News: Little About Kinkels' Upbringing Provides Clues to
His Dark Side, STAR-TRmuNE, June 21, 1998, at 19A.
98. Zucco, supranote 93.
99. Egan, supranote 93.
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psychopaths,"'
suffering from a "genetic susceptibility toward
violence,"'' or as having been imprisoned in, and obsessed with, a
marginal, distorted culture of evil or potential evil such as satanic
cults.' 0 2 Thus, the boys, all children between the ages of eleven and
seventeen, were imagined as absolutely autonomous. They were
portrayed as independent, not only in their actions, but even more, in
their very being, of all communal connections.
These boys were also associated by the media with a variety of
social trends and affiliations, all of which prize autonomy-withoutresponsibility. One journalist explained:
To varying degrees, each of the attackers seemed to have been obsessed by
violent pop culture. . . . The killer who has confessed in Pearl, Miss., says
he was a fan of violent fantasy video games and the nihilistic rock n' roll
lyrics of Marilyn Manson, as was the boy charged in the Springfield, Ore.,
shootings last month. The Springfield youth was.., enmeshed in violent
sites ....
television and Internet

In short, the sort of autonomy associated by the media with
children such as Kipland Kinkel ' 04suggests an individualism so extreme
that it virtually precludes choosing connection. The resulting portrait
dramatically reenforces the law's growing conclusion that a juvenile
justice system constructed around familial metaphors cannot serve such
children. The reenforcement is especially powerful because it is based,
not on proofs, but on images. Moreover, and of at least equal
consequence, the resulting portrait suggests the potential plight of the
autonomous child in a universe prepared to define childhood apart from
moral categories.

100. Why Are Children Killing? More Firepower, Fewer Restraints, FLA. TIMESUNION, March 29, 1998, at Al.
101. Id.
102. The boy responsible for the shooting in Pearl, Mississippi, Luke Woodham,
tried as an adult and sentenced to life in prison in June 1998, defended himself by
arguing that he was under the control of a local satanic cult. See John and Rossilli,
supra note 93.
103. Egan, supra note 93.
As the quote from Egan's article suggests, to some extent, the media did portray
these children as products of culture, if not community. The cultural trends referred to,
however, are marginal and deeply nihilistic.
104. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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B. The Implications ofAutonomy
Decided in 1967, in an era of civil rights and women's rights, In re
Gault reflects the law's broad concern at the time with guaranteeing
people's autonomy in order to ensure their equality. In proclaiming the
right of juvenile offenders to due process, the Court apparently hoped to
protect children as individuals, but still on terms somewhat different
from those available to adults.
Clearly, the apparent intent behind In re Gault differs starkly from
that behind recent laws and proposed laws that treat juvenile offenders
as adults. It is still possible, however, to ask whether these recent
changes, though very different from In re Gault, represented its likely
Although that question cannot be
consequence from the start.
definitively answered, a response can be found in the suggestion that the
Court's agenda in In re Gault may have been unactualizable from the
start.
Within the history of the West, the extension of autonomous
individuality has been accompanied by the loss of holistic,
hierarchically structured communities. For most people, the price of
living in such communities was high, in today's view, unbearably high:
the absence, generally even as pretension of equality and freedom.
However, for children, or at least for many children, the price of
autonomous individuality may also be high. That price seems to be the
erosion of social responsibility for children's welfare, both within
families and within institutions that support families. Insofar as children
are not, in fact, capable of reasoning and behaving as adults do, defining
them as autonomous individuals removes from them the protections,
however paternalistic, that society affords those in a dependent status,
but does not afford them the benefitsof autonomy.of5

105. This dilemma is not completely unique to children. The illusion of
autonomous individuality has frequently served as a pretext for economic and social
oppression by members of groups assumed responsible for their own plight. So, for
instance, the marketplace in the years before the development of the welfare state
presumed the owner and the worker equally autonomous, and thus equally responsible
for the bargains they together effected. That assumption ignored the economic
underpinnings of relationships in the marketplace and thereby served with significant
effectiveness to disguise the social ground on which pervasive inequalities were
sustained. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), illustrates strikingly the
implications of the assumption, central to nineteenth century liberalism, that freedom of
contract belonged as much to the worker as to the owner. The Court, invalidating a state
statute that limited the number of hours bakers could work, described the bakery owners
and employees as equally "persons who are sui juris." Id. at 54. The state, the Court
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Clearly, practical and theoretical implications of social and legal
reconceptualizations of juvenile offenders are complicated.
Such
reconceptualizations stem from, and distort, more pervasive
redefinitions of children and childhood. While society, though with less
and less conviction, continues to value images of children as fragile,
affectionate and precious, children responsible for serious crimes are
imagined as absolutely and eternally separate from decent community.
Such portraits of juvenile offenders justify a set of extreme responses.
Once institutionalized, those responses may, in turn, justify further
redefinitions of children within the society as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION

Proposals to abandon a juvenile justice system, defined through
familial metaphors, proliferate. These proposals are justified by striking
images of autonomous and rapacious juveniles. Society, increasingly
accustomed to viewing children as simply little adults, is ready to
assimilate such images and the proposals for reform that the images
engender, or at least justify.
In re Gault was revolutionary three decades ago in defining
children, even for limited purposes, as comparable to adults in certain
regards and, thus, as deserving constitutional protection. In re Gault
aimed to preserve childhood and to respect children's individuality.
Images of children connected with recent statutes and bills categorizing
juvenile offenders as adults are of a different order. These laws and
proposed laws signal a collapse of a vision of childhood that, in theory
at least, compelled society to treat all children, even the most difficult,
as deserving nurture, and to define them, accordingly, through familial
metaphors. In re Gault assumed community, and with it a moral
universe within which children, even if defined as autonomous for
certain purposes, would continue to find protection and direction.
Conversely, more recent statutes and bills aimed at treating wide
categories of juvenile offenders as the law treats adult criminals, assume
the collapse of a moral universe within which children, due to the very
nature of childhood, deserve to be encompassed and protected by

thus proclaimed, could not rightly deprive worker and owner, alike, of the right to
determine the dimensions of their relationship. In that, the Court ignored the realities of
power and, thus, eliding questions of social responsibility, made workers responsible for
their own plight. Oppression within the marketplace was therefore rendered almost
completely opaque.
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community.
In short, redefinitions of juvenile offenders are part of a more
extensive redefinition of childhood in American society which is, in
turn, part of a vast upheaval in the scope and meaning of family and
familial relationships.
As relationships within families begin
increasingly to resemble relationships within the marketplace, familial
metaphors become less and less powerful as models for designing and
justifying other social institutions.
Yet, at the same time society and the law struggle to preserve
romanticized images of children within families. Family law, while
increasingly amenable to the redefinition of adults within families as
autonomous individuals, has been far more reluctant to redefine children
similarly. A stark exception has begun to develop with regard to at least
a few children in families perceived as dysfunctional.
Thus, the law, generally hesitant to abandon deeply entrenched
notions of childhood and of children, has done exactly that with regard
to two groups of children who seem especially needful of the sort of
adult attendance and guidance associated almost automatically with
traditional images of vulnerable, fragile children. In both contexts, the
law responds to children who, while clearly vulnerable, are largely
unprotected. Moreover, both groups of children are problematic for a
society still committed, even though less and less consistently, to an
understanding of children as precious, innocent, and frail, and
committed as well, to an understanding of adults as obliged to protect
such children.
Yet, the law's implicit aim with regard to children granted
autonomy in the context of familial disputes differs almost completely
from its aim in redefining juvenile offenders as adult criminals. The
aim in the first instance is to recognize children's autonomy in order to
safeguard the possibility of creating new families for the children
involved, and thus presumably to enable these children to relinquish
their autonomy and reassert their status as children. In contrast, the law,
in viewing juvenile offenders as it views adult criminals, acknowledges
the incorrigibility of the children involved.
The first response reflects hope. The second reflects desperation.
Yet, in the end, the law's increasing readiness to redefine childhood,
and therein to view children as the law views their. adult counterparts, is
likely to be of more significance than are the differences among
particular expressions of that readiness. If such changes, still hesitant
and localized in the law's approach to children, are elaborated and
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generalized, then, in retrospect, the twentieth century's notion of
childhood as a precious stage of prolonged innocence will have been an
historic anomaly.

